Schlick first met Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1927 and did so several times before the latter would agree to be introduced to some of his colleagues. From 1927 to 1928 Wittgenstein met with small groups that included Schlick, almost always Waismann, sometimes Carnap, and sometimes Feigl and his future wife Maria Kesper. But it is doubtful that Wittgenstein ever attended any meetings of the Vienna Circle proper. And from 1929, Wittgenstein's contact with the Circle would be restricted to meetings with Schlick and Waismann only.[3]
Conversations from these later meetings (December 1929 up to March 1932) were recorded by Waismann, and eventually published in English translation in Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (1979). By the time these conversations began, Schlick had tasked Waismann with writing an exposition of Wittgenstein's philosophy.[4] This project would undergo radical transformation but the final text, inspired by WIttgenstein but very much Waismann's own work, was published posthumously in English as The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy in 1965. Further material and notes from the period were published in English under the editorship of Gordon Baker in 2003.[5]
Waismann later accused Wittgenstein of obscurantism because of what he considered to be his betrayal of the project of logical positivism and empirically-based explanation.[6]
Philosophy
Linguistic philosophy and logical positivism
In Introduction to Mathematical Thinking: The Formation of Concepts in Modern Mathematics (1936), Waismann argued that mathematical truths are true by convention rather than being necessarily (or verifiably) true. His collected papers were published posthumously in How I See Philosophy (1968, ed. R. Harré)[7] and Philosophical Papers (1976, ed. B. F. McGuinness).[8][9]
Porosity and verifiability
Waismann introduced the concept of open texture to describe the universal possibility of vagueness in empirical statements. He had coined the phrase "die Porosität der Begriffe" ("the porosity of concepts") for this purpose and credits William Kneale for suggesting the English term that he then adopted.[10]
It is probably based, Brian Bix suggests, "on a constructivist view of language Wittgenstein put forward in the early 1930s."[11] According to Waismann, even after measures have been taken to ensure that a statement is precise, there remains an inexhaustible source of vagueness due to an indefinite number of possibilities.[12] Waismann's notion of vagueness is slightly different from his concept of open texture―he explained that open texture is more like the possibility of vagueness;[13] vagueness can also be remedied so that it can be made more precise, while open texture cannot.[13]
Open texture has been found in legal philosophy through the writings of H. L. A. Hart (see Hart's "Formalism and Rule Scepticism" in The Concept of Law). According to Hart, vagueness constitutes a fundamental feature of legal languages.[14] It is claimed, however, that Waismann's conceptualization has limited practical application, since it is more for the extraordinary, while Hart's view of open texture concerns the more mundane, approaching the term in the context of a particular norm.[15]
^Shanker, S., & Shanker, V. A. (1986), Ludwig Wittgenstein: critical assessments. London: Croom Helm,50-51.
^Church, Alonzo (1973). "Review of How I see Philosophy". The Journal of Symbolic Logic. 38 (4): 663–665. doi:10.2307/2272024. ISSN0022-4812. JSTOR2272024. This book collects in a single volume the important philosophical papers of Waismann. The editor explains on page viii that Waismann's The relevance of psychology to logic (Aristotelian Society supplementary volume XVII, 1938, pp. 34-67) has been omitted as not forming a natural part of Waismann's later philosophy. It should be added that papers which were written by Waismann in German have also been omitted.
^Stock, Guy (1979). "Review of Philosophical Papers". The Philosophical Quarterly. 29 (114): 78–81. doi:10.2307/2219187. ISSN0031-8094. JSTOR2219187. This collection of fourteen papers spans the years 1928 to the 1950s. ... The earlier papers are mainly translations appearing in English for the first time. The later ones were written in English and are previously unpublished.
^Audi, Robert (1999). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, Robert Audi, 1999: The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Second Edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 632. ISBN9780521637220.
^ abFreeman, Michael; Smith, Fiona (2013). Law and Language: Current Legal Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 132. ISBN9780199673667.
^Urbina, Sebastián (31 August 2002). Legal Method and the Rule of Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. p. 81. ISBN9041118705.
^Beltrán, Jordi Ferrer; Ratti, Giovanni Battista (2012). The Logic of Legal Requirements: Essays on Defeasibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 196. ISBN9780199661640.
