Armies in Lebanon 1982–84, Samuel Katz and Lee E. Russell, Osprey Men-At-Arms series No. 165, 1985
Hirst, David (2010). Beware of Small States. NationBooks. pp. 144–145. ISBN978-1-56858-657-1. "In time, however, Arafat and his guerrilla leadership decided that they would have to withdraw, leaving no military and very little political or symbolic presence behind. Their enemy's firepower and overall strategic advantage were too great and it was apparently ready to use them to destroy the whole city over the heads of its inhabitants. The rank and file did not like this decision, and there were murmurings of 'treason' from some of Arafat's harsher critics. Had they not already held out, far longer than any Arab country in any former war, against all that the most powerful army in the Middle East – and the fourth most powerful in the world, according to Sharon – could throw against them? (...) But [Palestinians] knew that, if they expected too much, they could easily lose [Lebanese Muslim support] again. 'If this had been Jerusalem', they said, 'we would have stayed to the end. But Beirut is not outs to destroy."
^Helmer, Daniel Isaac. Flipside of the Coin: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982–2000. DIANE Publishing, 2010.
“Land for Peace Timeline”. British-Israeli Communications & Research Centre (2006年). 2010年12月22日時点のオリジナルよりアーカイブ。2011年1月25日閲覧。
“Hezbollah 101: Who is the militant group, and what does it want?”. Christian Science Monitor (2012年7月19日). 2012年10月4日閲覧。 “Iran has also played an instrumental role in building up Hezbollah's military capabilities over the years, which enabled the group's impressive military wing to oust Israel from south Lebanon in 2000”
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